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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
PACIFIC STATES CAST IRON PIPE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
and
ALYIN T. LOCKE,
Intervening Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No.
8336

HARSH UTAH CORPORATION, a corporation, HARSH INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a corporation, and HAROLD
J. SCHNITZER, an individual,
Defendants and Appellants. f

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Throughout this reply brief, appellants, Harsh Utah
Corporation, Harsh Investment Corporation and Harold
J. Schnitzer, will be referred to either by name or as
defendants and respondent, Alvin T. Locke, will be reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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£erred to as plaintiff or by name. Other parties to the
action who have appeared from time to time but are
no longer before this court will be referred to by the name
of the party.
All italics are ours.
This reply brief is made necessary by the fact that
there are many misstatements concerning the record and
the proper inferences that may be drawn from testimony
quoted in the brief of respondent. It is also necessary
since in the brief of respondent, he is making claim to
additional sums by way of a cross appeal. Damages are
claimed to have been the result of inadequate financing of
the Hill Field Housing Project. Defendants will not
restate the facts for in their original brief a full and
complete statement is made. However, it is not to ba
believed that by not stating again the facts in this
reply brief defendants in any way are accepting the facts
as set forth in the brief of plaintiff. As a matter of fact,
defendants have discovered in the statement of facts
and throughout the brief of the plaintiff a great number of inaccurate and false statements. These inaccurate and false statements refer primarily to the effect
or inference which can properly be drawn from specific
testimony which is set forth in the brief of plaintiff.
Defendants state to the Court that it cannot accept on
their. face the references by plaintiff to the various secSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tions of different witnesses' testimonies.

The court

must examine carefully those portions of the testimony
to which the plaintiff refers for in many instances the
referred to testimony does in no way support or justify
the claim which is made for the testimony by plaintiff.
Throughout defendants' reply brief, reference will
be made to the appendix of defendants' main brief on
appeal and also to the appendix of the respondent's brief.
In addition, defendants will attach to this brief an appendix setting forth an additional exhibit which the defendants feel is material and repeated references will
be necessitated to said appendix material.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE BASIC DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN DEFENDANTS AND THE PLAINTIFF IS, WHAT .COSTS DID THE
PARTIES INTEND TO CONSIDER BEFORE A PROFIT
COULD BE CALCULATED OUT OF WHICH A BONUS
COULD BE PAID.
POINT II.
WHAT ITEMS OF INCOME WERE INTENDED BY THE
PARTIES TO BE ·CONSIDERED IN CALCULATING THE
PROFITS OR AS A BASIS FOR A BONUS.
POINT III.
THE HILL FIELD WHERRY HOUSING PROJECT WAS
ADEQUATELY, COMPLETELY AND FULLY FINANCED
BY HAROLD J. SCHNITZER.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
'THE BASIC DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN DEFENDANTS AND THE PLAINTIFF IS, WHAT ·COSTS DID THE
PARTIES INTEND TO CONSIDER BEFORE A PROFIT
COULD BE CALCULATED OUT OF WHICH A BONUS
COULD BE PAID.

Defendants would like it clearly understood that
they do not contend that there is not, in the parlance of
accounting work, a definite distinction between direct
construction costs and costs not directly connected with
the actual construction work being carried forward. The
indirect costs include all of the expenses of financing a
project and the overhead which is incurred in supervisory and 1nanagement expense. The accountant for
plaintiff was correct in testifying that there is a difference between "construction costs" and "project costs."
The fundamental difference that exists concerns
the interpretation of the October 4th agreement. Under
the terms of that agreement did the parties Schnitzer
and Locke have in mind distinguishing between "construction costs" and "project costs" or were they talking
about the total costs of constructing the project upon
which bids had been submitted.
Defendants believed that the October 4th agreement
can stand only one logical interpretation and construction which is that when the parties discussed costs in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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connection with construction of a housing project, they
were talking .about all of the costs that would reasonably be incurred.
The background for the preparation of the October
4th agreement and the circumstances surrounding its
preparation were properly received to place the contract in a setting which would give the court a definite
insight into the meaning of the terms used. However,
when all of the background material is in and the setting
of the contract is before the court, the fundamental question of the meaning of the contract is a question of law.
Throughout the history of the common law in Oregon
and in the State of Utah, the meaning of a contract and
the language used therein, has always been a question
of law. On legal propositions, this court has full scope
of review.
This court should determine anew the legal effect
of the October 4th agreement. It should establish the
various rights, duties and liabilities of the parties after
determining the meaning of the agreement.
In determining the meaning and legal effect of a
contract no evidence either expert or otherwise could be
received from any source. A legal document such as
the October 4th agreement is a subject upon which judges
are the highest authorities and are the 1nost acceptable
experts. No evidence or opinion is acceptable or could
be received to set forth the effect of the language con-
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tained in a legal document: See: W. H. Walker v. J. TV.
McLoud, 204 F .S. 302, 51 L. Ed. 495, 27 S. Ct. 293; I daJlw
Forwarding Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 8 Utah 41;
29 Pac. 826; Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.
( 2d) 731, 20 Am. J ur. 672, 18 A.L.R. ( 2d) 1100.
This particular concept is important for the only
evidence there is in the record concerning the distinction between "construction costs" and "project costs"
comes from the certified public accountant employed by
plaintiff, one Goldberg.
Goldberg's testimony that there was and is a distinction between "construction costs" and "project costs"
was not specifically applied to the October 4th agreement. By innuendo and inference, it would appear that
the plaintiff requests this court to accept the Goldberg
distinction between "construction costs" and "project
costs" as being a distinction which the parties had in
mind in the preparation of the October 4th agreement.
Neither the phrase "construction costs" nor "project
costs" was used by the parties in the contract. Defendants
submit

that

all

of the

conduct

of the

parties,

all of the language of the agreement, all of the legal
principles and common sense, indicates beyond doubt
that the parties to the October 4th agreement were talking about the total costs of constructing the Wherry
Housing Projects.
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Throughout the record there is not one act of either
party which is inconsistent with the idea that all costs
were to be considered before any profit or bonus was
to be calculated.
The basic figures on which the bonuses were to be
calculated was .a figure which the constructing corporation was in no way concerned with. It was the bid figure
accepted by the government. The bid figure accepted by
the government was only the concern of the sponsoring corporation.
The testimony of all the parties show that prior to
the acceptance of the bids and prior to the organization
of the Harsh Utah Corporation, plaintiff received from
Schnitzer personally his $1,000 per month pay check and
at no time did he consider that he was other than an
employee of Harold J. Schnitzer. Under oath plaintiff
has stated he considered himself an employee of Schnitzer. Schnitzer was always concerned with all costs since
in the final analysis he had to pay all of the costs.

It would seem to be an established principle of law
from which there is no dissent that the construction and
interpretation of a contract that is in writing, clear,
unambiguous and uncertain in its terms is a strict question of law for the court to decide. The appellate court
has the unrestricted right to review and determine the
correctness of the leg.al solution which the trial court
decreed.
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This principle has been clearly set forth in the ra~rs
from Oregon where the contract of October -t, 1951, was
drawn. They hold that the interpretation of a written instrument is a matter of'law.
In Henry v. Harker, 61 Ore. 276, 122 Pac. 298, the
Supreme Court of Oregon had a situation before it
where a party made an attempt to vary and change the
terms of a written instrument by evidence of an oral
modification. In setting forth the principle which defendants seek to apply to the October 4th contract, the
court there stated (p. 299):
"It is claime{l that this contract is ambiguous,
and that, therefbre, its construction is left as a
question of fact, and that, the court sitting as a
jury having found the fact for the plaintiff, such
finding is conclusive upon this court. The construction of a contract is always a matter of law
for the court. If technical words or terms of art
or local phrases not in common use are introduced,
or if it is uncertain to what person or what thing
.a writing refers, oral evidence may be introduced
to explain the language used, or if the language
itself is not clear, and it can be shown that both
parties placed a particular interpretation upon it
and acted upon that interpretation, evidence showing such interpretation may be admitted. But
when, as in this case, the contract consists wholly
of a writing or series of writings all admitted to
be genuine and containing no technical terms, the
construction of the writings becomes a matter of
pure law for the court. Hutchinson v. Bowler, 5
M. & W. 535; Goddard v. Foster, 17 Wall. 123, 21
L. Ed. 589. And this rule is even applied to oral
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contracts where their terms are not disputed.
Globe Works v. vVright, 106 Mass. 207; American
Towing & L. Co. v. Baker-Whitely Coal Co., 111
Md. 504, 75 Atl. 341."
The Oregon Supreme Court had another occasion
at a later date to restate and apply the principle that a
written instrument is to be interpreted and construed
.as a matter of lav;r. In Rose v. U.S. Lnmber & Box Co.,
107 Ore. 513, 215 Pac. 171, the defendant and plaintiff
were attempting to give great stress to oral statements
concerning the terms and conditions of the contract which
the court was interpreting. The Oregon Supreme Court
explained the rule and the language there, which defendant respectfully submits is applicable to the present case (p. 17 4) :
"::\Inch stress was laid in argument by the
defendant on some· testimony given by the plaintiff, where he said in substance, that he never
agreed to deliver any fixed quantity of lumber
per month under this contract. The contention of
the defendant is that this amounted to a construction of the contract by the plaintiff himself in a
way that disclosed its want of mutuality. The
argument is fallacious. True it is that the contract itself does not specify any particular number of feet of lumber to be delivered per month.
The measure of the quantity to he delivered is
the output of the mill resulting from a continuous
run. What that might amount to probably would
vary, so that the plaintiff was justified in saying that no particular amount per month was
agreed upon. The contract being in writing, its
construction is a question of law for the court,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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with the result, in this instance, that the contract
is plainly one containing mutual covenants of the
parties, one being the consideration for the other."
The latest authority which comes out of the State
of Oregon and succinctly sets forth the principle which
defendants request be applied to the contract before this
court, is Columbia Digger Sand & Gravel Co. v. Ross
Island Sand & Gravel Co., 145 Ore. 96, 25 P. 2d 911. The
Oregon Supreme Court there stated the rule of law in
the following language (p. 916):
"Defendant predicates error upon the charge
of the court leaving the question to the jury as
to whether this Readymix was within the contract
for the reason that it leaves the construction of
the contract to the jury and not to the court. The
construction of a written contract is for the court,
and should not devolve upon the jury. Section
9-214, Oregon Code 1930; Henry v. Harker, 61 Or.
276, 118 P. 205, 122 P. 298; City of Seaside v.
Randles, 92 Or. 650, 180 P. 319; Rose v. U. S.
Lbr. & Box Co., 108 Or. 237, 215 P. 171; Wallace
v. American Life Ins. Co., 111 Or. 510, 225 P. 192,
227 P. 465."
This court has had occasions very recently to pass
upon the rules covering the duties of the finder of the
fact and the court in determining the meaning of the
language of a written instrument. Mathis v. Madsen,
1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P. 2d 952, concerned a contract which
all of the court conceded was .ambiguous and uncertain
in its terms. The court applying the rule that the meaning and interpretation of a contract is a question of law
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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set forth the principles .applicable, even if it were conceded as defendant does not concede that the October
4th agreement is ambiguous and uncertain in its terms
(p. 52) :

" * * * That fact alone, however, does not
relieve the Court (nor this Court) of its responsibility to ascertain its meaning if that can
be done under the provisions of law respecting
this type of instrument. In searching for the
meaning the Court must first examine the language used in the instrument itself and accord to
it the weight and effect which the instrument itself
may show that the parties intended the words to
have. If then its meaning is still ambiguous or
uncertain, the Court may consider other contemporaneous writing concerning the same subject
matter, and may, if it is still uncertain, consider
parole evidence of the parties' intention. See
Burt v. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207, 143 P. 234;
Beagley v. United States Gypsum Co., Utah, 235
P. 2d 783."
The holding in the JJ1 at his case has apparently always been the law of the State of Utah. In Armstrong

v. Larsen, 55 Utah 347, 186 Pac. 97, the principle was
set down in the following language (p. 98):
"The terms of the written contract .are neither
ambiguous nor uncertain. It was therefore the
duty of the court to construe the contract and
advise the jury of the respective rights of the
parties thereunder. The request embodied a correct interpretation of the contract. It was the
duty of the court to give that or similar instructions. The failure to do so, in our judgment, con-
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stituted prejudical error. B.ank v. Peterson, 33
Utah 209, 93 Pac. 566, 126 Am. St. Rep. 817;
Lowry v. ~1egee, 52 Ind. 107; Kamphouse v. Gaff.
ner, 73 Ill. 453; Gage v. Meyers, 59 Mich. 300, 26
N. W. 522."
Additional cases which clearly show that the principle of law under our Utah decisions and under the
decisions of the State of Oregon are the san1e as Bailey
v. Spalding-Livingston Investment Go., 43 Utah 535, 136
Pac. 962, and Penn Star JJ1ining Co. v. Lyman, G-± Utah
343, 231 Pac. 107.
POINT II.
WHAT ITEMS OF INCOME WERE INTENDED BY THE
PARTIES 'TO BE ·CONSIDERED IN CALCULATING THE
PROFITS OR AS A BASIS FOR A BONUS.

(a) Rental Income from Harsh Utah Corporation
was Improperly Included in Calculations of the Bonu:J
to Locke.
An additional difference in interpretation of the
October 4th agreement by plaintiff and defendants arises
out of the inclusion of the net rental, which was received
by Harsh Utah after Harsh Investment was through
with the construction phase, in the mnounts which are
to be denominated income.
The trial court included in the income of the Harsh
Investment the rental income which Harsh Utah had
actually received. It held that this income was properly
a construction income under the contract of October 4th.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The subject matter of rental income and interest in the
ownership and management of the Project after construction was covered specifically. See appendix of defendants' brief, at page 10, second paragraph. It is there
set forth specifically that Locke shall have no interest
in and to the ownership or management of the projects
mentioned or in connection with any profits that may be
derived therefrom. The language is clear that the interest
of Locke would be 1imited to the construction of the projeds.
The basic concept upon which plaintiff attempts
to claim an interest in the rental income seems to be a
twofold proposition. First, he claims that he is entitled
to participate in the rental income by reason of the fact
that the project was finished in less time than the maximum permitted under the agreement with the Air Force
and F.H.A. He claims the remaining months which were
allowed should be considered as a construction period
and any income earned should be alloted to the Harsh
Investment. Second, plaintiff claims a right to have
rental income alloted to him by re.ason of an oral agreement between himself and Schnitzer that income from
rentals during the 24-month period of construction should
be included in computing his bonus.
Apparently plaintiff is of the opinion that he can
on the basis of his testimony alone show an oral modification of a written instrument. At page 61 of respondent's brief, there is cited for the court the proposition
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of the oral modification of .a written instrument and the
record is referred to substantiate the claim. The record
reference is T. 42M-45M 797.
The referred to testimony of Locke indicates that on
an occasion, when he and Schnitzer were riding on the
train to Great Falls, Montana, Schnitzer requested that
the employees at the Gre.at Falls Project be placed on an
overtime schedule and at that time in discussing the
Great Falls project, Locke claims that Schnitzer agreed
that rental income on the Great Falls project would be
included in determining whether or not there was any
profit from the construction of the project. Again when
Schnitzer and Locke were returning from W.ashington,
D.C. in 1953 and it appeared that the costs of the Montana project were very close to the amount of funds available to construct the project, Locke again states that
Schnitzer agreed that the rental income on the Great
F.alls Montana job would be included in income for determining whether or not there was any bonus from the
construction of the Great Falls job.
Plaintiff's attorney attempted to get from his client
a statement that these conversations which he refers to
also pertained to the Hill Field Project in Utah but failed.
It is submitted that even if this court accepts the proposition (which it cannot) that specific terms of .a written
instrument may be varied by an oral agreement made in
informal conversation, still the oral agreement referred
to did not concern in any way the Hill Field project but
concerned only the Great Falls Project in Montana.
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Under the case law both in Utah and Oregon an oral
modification of a written instrument must be executed
for consideration or shown by clear, convincing and conclusive evidence. Craswell v. Biggs, 160 Or. 547, 86 P. 2d
71; Mawhinney v. Jensen (Utah) 232 P. 2d 769; Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions, Inc., 88 Utah 194, 48 P.
(2d) 489.

This oral .agreement which plaintiff is claiming
exists between Schnitzer, the individual, and Locke.
At no place does plaintiff claim that Harsh Investment
agreed with Locke that he would be paid a bonus based
on rental income which Harsh Utah earned at Hill
Field. At no place in the record is there a clearer demonstration of the concept which defendants have of the relationship which existed between the two corporations,
Harsh Utah, Harsh Investment and Schnitzer than in this
recitation by the plaintiff concerning rental income.
All of the parties to the October 4th agreement understood that Harsh Utah and Harsh Investment and the
various other corporations which were organized by
Schnitzer were the means to an end. The end was the
construction of certain Vfherry I-Iousing Projects. What
the parties had in mind w.as not a profit to various segments or individual units in the group of instruments
but a profit for the overall project and a profit to Schnitzer.
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The basic inconsistency in plaintiff's arguments is
demonstrated by the proposition that an oral modification can be effective between Schnitzer and Locke on the
J\1:ont.ana project and without more made applicable to the
Utah project. The inconsistency permeates the whole
argument of the plaintiff in his brief and in his presentation before the trial court. He, on one hand, must keep
Harsh Utah separate from Harsh Investment and on the
other, show Schnitzer as the personification of all corporations.
(b) The Change Order Extras Amount was Improperly Calculated.
At pages 56 and 57 of his brief, plaintiff makes reference to the fact that certain changes in the work to be
done at Hill Field were made and requests for extras
were made to compensate Harsh Utah for the extra
work anticipated.
Plaintiff quotes Article XV covering changes in
work. I-Ie then attempts to show that there was an agreement between Harsh Utah and Harsh Investment concerning the amount which Harsh Utah would pay
Harsh Investment for the changes in the construction that
was accomplished by Harsh Investment.
There is no showing whatsoever of any agreement
ever having been 1nade. There is no evidence of any discussion between Locke and Schnitzer or anyone else in the
management of Harsh Utah and Harsh InvestSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ment concerning the amount of money Harsh Utah would
have to pay or be obligated to pay Harsh Investment
for the changes. In fact counsel for plaintiff in his trial
brief stated :
-- :':~~~iJ
"Only contract between HARSH UTAH CORPORATION as owner .and HARSH INVEST::1\.fENT CORPORATION as contractor, concerning amount to be paid to HARSH INVESTTh.fENT
CORPORATION was 'CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT'- 'LUMP SUM' (Ex. #61), wherein, pursuant to 'ARTICLE 3-THE CONTRACT SUM'
-'The owner shall pay the contractor for the performance of the contract, subject to additions and
deductions provided herein, on account of construction the sum of $2,995,205.00 cash.' There is
absolutely no evidence of any other agreement between owner .and contractor and absolutely no evidence, oral or written, varying this contract price."
In an attempt to show that there was an agreement between Harsh Utah and Harsh Investment for
the payment for change extras, defendant cites the testimony of the witness Hutchinson and quotes a portion of
that testimony at appendix page 16. The quoted testimony in no way supports a finding that Hutchinson,
Harsh Utah or Harsh Investment had entered into any
kind of an agreement concerning the amount to be paid
by Harsh Utah to Harsh Investment for extras.
Plaintiff then attempts to show by an F.H.A. official that the change requests that were submitted constituted a contract between Harsh Utah and Harsh
Investment. Plaintiff cites appendix page 27 to 29 to
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support this assertion. Even assuming that the F.H.A.
official may have some helpful interpretation of the
change request, that interpretation would in no way be
binding upon either Harsh Utah or Harsh Investment.
But the testimony quoted by plaintiff at appendix page
27 to 29 fails to support in any way the claim and in no
way indicates that the change request constituted a contract between Harsh Utah and Harsh Investment.
Not satisfied with the testimony of Warwick or
Hutchinson as quoted at page 16 and appendix pages
27 and 29, plaintiff attempted to show that the witness
Isaacson, the inspector on the Wherry Housing Project
at Hill Field interpreted the change request to mean
that Harsh Utah was agreeing to pay Harsh Investment
the amount of the requested change. Plaintiff quotes
Is.aacson's testimony at the appendix pages 30 to 32.
Not one word of what Isaacson said indicated in any way
that he or Harsh Utah or Harsh Investment ever thought
that the change request fixed the amount Harsh Utah had
agreed to p.ay Harsh Investment. Most of the change
requests were only estimates of extra costs. Many were
completely disallowed. Some were allowed in part and
disallowed in part because of technical rules of the F.H.A.
No one could predict the amounts which would ultimately
be approved and allowed. At the time of trial no one
even knew the final amount because no final approval
by the F.H.A. had been granted.
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This particular aspect of the plaintiff's case is extremely important to him. Without it over half of his
claimed bonus is lost. Only by increasing the lump sum
contract amount above the lump sum is it possible for
plaintiff to claim a bonus. If plaintiff is required to look
solely to Harsh Investment and its construction receipts
for his bonus, none will be available.
The extent to which Locke was to participate in the
changes in the increased allowance as F.H.A. adjustments
is a matter specifically covered by the October 4th agreement. The following is the applicable language:
"* * *Locke shall receive .a sum equal to ten per
cent (10%) of all net profits received by Harsh
as F .H.A. adjustments, the same being additional
compensation to Harsh for changes in plans and
specifications, or increased labor costs, from the
United States Government for the construction
of said projects, or any of them, over and above
the profits involved in the original bids of Harsh
accepted by the Government."
No attempt has ever been made to ascertain whether
profit was actually made on work accomplished .as
changes in plans or specifications or increased labor
costs. It is clear, however, that only the amounts actually
received as mortgage increases was to enter into the
calculations, then only 10o/o of "net profits." The trial
court added the full amount of the requested changes as
estimated in his final judgment and then gave Locke 50o/o
of the amount after giving defendant the 10% allowance
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required by the contract. In the light of the quoted sections of the contract the court's action is demonstratively erroneous.
The language quoted cle.arly shows a different way
for considerations of F.H.A. adjustment yet the adjustments are handled exactly the same as the amount of the
original lump sun1 from the "Lump Sum Contract."
The Goldberg audit is premised on the idea that the
adjustments were to be handled in the same manner as
the lump sum and therefore correction must be made if
the judgment is to properly resolve the claims of the
parties.
Defendants have strenuously resisted any and all
claims that the amount of the change allowance be added
to the lump sum. If it were ,added to the amount of the
mortgage the resulting total was so small that under no
accounting theory would Locke be entitled to a bonus.
At no place in the evidence is there any showing that
Harsh Investment and Harsh Utah ever entered into
any agree1nent concerning the overtime which Harsh
Investment paid to employees .at Hill Field. Nothing
in the record indicates that Harsh Investment was to receive any additional consideration by reason of having
to pay overti1ne. At no place is there any agreement that
it might take rental income from Harsh Utah until the
allowed construction period was over. It would be a
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strange practice indeed if a builder who finished a construction project ahead of schedule could rent the project
and collect income from it until the maximum period allowed for construction had elapsed.
For plaintiff to establish .a right to have additional
sums paid by Harsh Utah to Harsh Investment from
rentals he must rely upon Schnitzer's oral agreement
on the :Montana job and show that he was after all the
party who was in control of both Harsh Utah and
the Harsh Investment and in effect is the real party in
interest. If he adopts such a position and admits the fact
that Schnitzer is the real person out of whose pocket
losses must be paid and into whose pocket any profit will
flow, then he defeats his own purpose. Admittedly a full
.and complete accounting reveals that no profit was made
by Schnitzer. Contrast the way Goldberg attempts to
handle the contract between Harsh Utah and Harsh Invesment with his inconsistent treatment of the profit
allowed to Pacific Coast Equipment Company on its
transactions with Harsh Investment.
It is conceded by plaintiff that if profit must be made

by Schnitzer, then Locke is :t!Ot entitled to any bonus for
no profit whatsoever was earned by him. The uncontroverted accountings show that only by taking from Schnitzer's personal funds a sum of money and arbitrarily denominating it "profit" is it possible to award a judgment
in favor of Locke. It is respectfully submitted that such
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action violates every intendment of the parties and is
contrary to equity and justice which this court should
administer with even hand.
At page 66 of plaintiff's brief, he sets forth a contention that this court should ignore the existence of
Harsh Utah and Harsh Investment whenever that would
be to the benefit of Locke and set them up and recognize
their existence whenever to do so would benefit Locke.
He justifies this claim of on again off again recognition
of the existence of the separate corporate entity by a
statement that to permit the existence of the corporations
would perpetrate a fraud on Locke. Nothing specific
is alleged at any place concerning any fraud. Apparently
plaintiff contends that there is fraud in the air and in
some way he should be .able to receive some benefit from
it.
Even in the brief, fraud is just generally alluded to.
This court by its decisions recognizes that when a fraud
is claimed, it must be set out in specific detail. Plaintiff
knows that fraud cannot be claimed by a general nonspecific statement. Desperate men will resort to any device to gain their ends.
No place in the evidence, no place in the record and
no place in the accounting has there ever been any evidence presented that anyone ever attempted to cheat or
to defraud plaintiff. The evidence is full of the details of
how plaintiff cheated and defrauded his employer at
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every turn of the road. He was forgiven and taken back
into the good graces of the employer. Judgment w.as
awarded against him for the amounts which the evidence
demonstrated he had defrauded and misappropriated.
POINT III.
THE HILL FIELD WHERRY HOUSING PROJECT WAS
ADEQUATELY, COMPLETELY AND FULLY FINANCED
BY HAROLD J. SCHNITZER.

A basically erroneous conception is advanced and
put forward by plaintiff concerning the manner in which
the projects at Hill Field, Great Falls, and at Barstow,
California, were financed by Schnitzer. There were numerous transfers of funds between the various corporations which defendant, Schnitzer, owned and was using
to accomplish the work at Hill Field, Gre.at Falls and
Barstow. Schnitzer, throughout the construction projects,
felt free to use his financial resources at whatever point
the need for those resources arose. As a consequence on
numerous occasions, funds were used to pay obligations
at Schnitzer's own bank, obligations for Harsh Investment, H.arsh Utah, Harsh Construction and Harsh California. These transfers of funds were made openly and
were recorded accurately on the books of the corporation
and were something which was known to Locke. For
him to deny that he had knowledge of it in the face of the
fact that he spent one-third of his time in the home office
where the books and records of the financial transactions
were handled is unbelievable. But regardless of whether
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porations to another or to the defendant, Schnitzer, himself personally the only basic question is, did any of the
transfers between Schnitzer, individually, or Harsh Investment or Harsh Utah in any way detrimentally affect the financing and construction of the Harsh Hill
Field Project.
No evidence was ever presented that the transfers
of funds between the various corporations and Mr.
Schnitzer in any way prevented the proper financing of
the Hill Field Project. The controller, Ellis, testified
that the accounts of Harsh Investment were current
and that the bills of that corporation were paid promptly
and without any defalcation of any kind (Tr. 1070). The
accountings prove without any possible contradiction
that after all of the subcontractors, materialmen and
parties who had actually participated in the construction
project had been paid there was still on deposit with
the court, funds greatly in excess of any just demand on
either Schnitzer, Harsh Utah or Harsh Investment.
During the trial, because plaintiff made so much of
the fact that funds were transferred fron1 the various
corporations to each other to Schnitzer and from Schnitzer back to the various corporations, it was requested
that the controller of the corporations prepare a statement showing the various transfers and the outcome of
the financial manipulations which were necessary to provide adequate finances at each of the projects. The
compilatjon became Exhibit 195.
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It shows on page ii (App.) the total amounts received

by Harsh Utah from the Irving Trust Company which
includes the personal escrowed funds. The total amounts
which were paid over to the Harsh Investment by Schnitzer or his wholly owned corporations. The document
shows that there had been received from Irving Trust
Company up to the time of the trial, a total of $2,752,704.00. This total consisted of all payments from the
proceeds of the mortgage amounting to $2,245,546.00 and
payments from the escrowed funds in the amount of
$51:2,158.00. Page ii (App.) shows a breakdown through
the period of construction of the amounts paid on the Hill
Field Project costs. The total is $2,747,775.00. The difference between receipts and expenditures is $4,929.00.
This small sum in no way effected the financing of the
Hill Field Project.

The court records prove beyond any possible dispute
that funds are still available for the payment of all subcontractors, materialmen and others making claims
against the Harsh Investment and Harsh Utah. The
deposit with the Davis County Treasurer, is greatly in
excess of any sum which any person can legitimately
claim is due them for services rendered or materials
supplied at the Hill Field Wherry Housing Project.
No attack was ever made on the accuracy, validity
and truthfulness of Exhibit 195. It stands in the record
uncontroverted and uncontradicted. Defendants have
reproduced the exhibit at pages i and ii of the appendix
in this brief.
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The F.H.A. rules and regulations which are quoted
and set forth in defendant's main brief require of a spon ..
sor that a completion bond in the amount of ten percent
of the construction costs be placed with the government
authorities to insure the adequacy of the funds which the
sponsor agreed to provide. Such a bond was supplied
by the Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company
and was in the amount of $299,521. The bond is discussed
at page 90 of defendants' brief. The bond being a completion bond was an absolute guarantee that the project
would be completed and the bills and expenses incurred
paid as they came due. Such bonds require large liquid
collateral which Schnitzer furnished the bonding company. With the bond and the large cash deposit there is
a double guarantee of adequate financing which shows
beyond question that Schnitzer financed properly and
adequately the Housing Project.
It is respectfully subn1itted that the uncontradicted,
undisputed evidence shows that the Wherry Housing
Project was completely, fully and adequately financed
at all states of the construction; that the court's finding
that it was not properly financed is without support in
the evidence. Since it was properly financed the court's
finding that there was no damage resulting to plaintiff
is correct.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, defendants would like to state in a few
paragraphs, the primary considerations before the Supreme Court and to bring into focus, if possible, the
large and material differences between the position of
plaintiff and defendants.
(a) The Accounting Information in the Trial Court
was Premature.
At the time of the Goldberg audit, at the time of the
Card Greaves audit, and during all of the trial no final
and complete accounting could be prepared on the Housing Project at Hill Field. The project was not closed;
the .amount of Change Order Extras had not been determined. A great number of disputes between claimant on
the project and the Harsh people had not been resolved.
The exact amounts due to various subcontractors and
materialmen had not been determined. As a consequence,
all of the accountings had to be tentative only. At the
close of the trial, after the closing papers were prepared
under supervision of the F.H.A., the amounts of Change
Order Extras determined, and the final judgments entered by the court for the various claimants, then defendants moved the trial court for permission to bring the
accounting information up-to-date.
Part of the information offered was the F.H.A.
project analysis showing the completed project and the
adjustments in the mortgage figure. Defendants sought
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to introduce evidence concerning the date of completion
and the various other documents which finalized the
project at Hill Field. This motion (R. 159-61) was filed
on the 28th day of J.anuary, 1955.
The Court refused to permit the filing as exhibits
of the documents which finalized the housing project.
The documents were placed in the record and are now
before the court even though not admitted as exhibits.
There was no questioon concerning their accuracy or authenticity nor the fact that they would very materially
effect the figures which had been used by the court.
The documents would require .adjustments in the accountings which were n1ade while the project was still under
construction. The actual effect that the closing figures
had on the project are shown in the appendix to defendants' main brief, as a part of the Peat, Marwick, :Mitchell
accounting. This accounting it is hoped will assist the
court .in understanding the effect of v.arious differences
between the Greaves accounting, the Goldberg accounting
and the true and accurate figures which are demonstrated by the record before the court.
The accountings demonstrate that there can be no
possible payment of a bonus to Locke. They demonstrate
that the construction project when considered as .a whole
and when all of the costs are taken into account did not
result in a profit to any person.
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The trial court understood that it would be necessary
to make adjustment in the accounting figures which were
received. Locke's case was originally scheduled to follow
all of the other c.ases which were at issue. To accommodate counsel for plaintiff the Locke case was commenced
at an earlier date and was tried prior to the time that
there was any determination as to exactly how much was
due and owing the v.arious subcontractors whose matters
were in litigation. It was then anticipated that adjustments would be made and would necessarily have to be
made if the accounts were to show accurately the profits
and losses on the housing project. These are the anticipated .adjustments which the court refused to permit
at the close of the case. The rational of such a refusal is
difficult for defendants to ascertain. It is defendants'
position that there could be no reason why the accounting
information should not be brought up to date and the
accurate figures presented .and used by the trial court as
a basis for his judgment.
(b) False claims of profits.
In Locke's brief, he continually refers to the enormous profit which will be realized by defendants. Those
profits are entirely fictitious, speculative and uncertain.
For instance, in his brief, Locke claims that Schnitzer will have projects worth seven million dollars in
Mont.ana and Utah. This statement is entirely false and
knowingly so. The equity of Schnitzer will be only such
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sums as he has actually paid as costs for the construrtion of the projects. The advancements from the various
mortgages must be repaid in full and with interest. For
plaintiff to ignore the tremendous obligations which must
be liquidated prior to the time Schnitzer can realize .anything out of his capital investments is to attempt to perpetrate on this court a false and fictitious concept.
At another point in the brief of plaintiff, he claims
that defendants will have $30,000.00 of tax free income.
What he is not stating to this court is that that income
will be depreciation calculated on the projects. Whether
or not it is realized will depend on whether or not the
projects maintain their value and are profitable investments and whether or not the projects are managed in
such a way so that returns may be obtained.
It is a false and fictitious notion that there is any
assurance that defendants will ever receive any return
whatsoever on the money invested in the housing project
or that there will ever be a return of the capital invested
in said projects. There is no guarantee by any agency
in the United States Government that the sponsor and
builder of vVherry Housing Projects shall realize any
profit at all. The limitations are on the .amounts which
n1ay be realized. The act requires and provides that there
shall not be a return in excess of six and one-half percent
on all the money which has been used for the construction.
Out of this six and one-half percent must be paid the
mortgage interest payn1ent and any other interest
charges.
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It is recognized by all parties that what Locke and
Schnitzer had in mind in the construction of the Wherry
Housing Project was a so-called windfall profit. It was
to be realized by constructing the housing projects at .a
cost less than the amount that could be obtained as advancements on mortgage.

This so-called windfall profit becomes possible only
if the efficiency and economy with which the projects
are constructed exceeds F.H.A. expectations. Estimated
costs of replacements fixing maximum bids were placed
on each project by the F .H.A. experts and officials. The
mortgage was calculated at ninety percent of the bid accepted by the government. In order for there to be a windfall profit, the sponsor had to construct the project
for less than ninety percent of the bid which was accepted by the government for the construction of the project.
There is nothing illegal, unconscionable or inequitable about sponsors attempting to make windfall profits
by the exercise of ingenuity, efficiency .and economy in
the construction of a Wherry Housing Project. The
Wherry Housing Act was aimed at interesting in government housing construction, private enterprise and private
builders. The private ·builder would be interested in
constructing the project only if he could see that to do so
would net him a profit. The profit, in order to entice the
builder into government housing when the number of
tenants is uncertain and dependent upon the amount of
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defense expenditures, would have to be one which can be
calculated and .ascertained at the beginning of the construction project.
Defendants' experience at the Hill Field Wherry
Housing Project has been very unprofitable. Contrary
to the speculations that plaintiff makes in his brief, the
occupancy rate is way down. The mortgage on the project
has been returned to the Federal Housing Administration
for handling. It has been necessary for the sponsor to
obtain from the Federal Government a moratorium for
the payn1ent of the amounts which are currently due on
the mortgage balance.
It has been held that Harsh Investment should be
permitted to increase its lump sum contract amount by
fictitious figures as follows :
(a) Change order extras in the sum of $178,672.00.
The actual amount received was $154,400.00. The difference between these two figures being $24,272.00.
(b)

Total receipts to the Harsh Interests was $3,-

173,877.00. The actual total amount received by Harsh
Utah, Harsh Investment and Harold Schnitzer from the
mortgage .as it was finally adjusted, is $2,791,200, a difference of $382,677.
(c)

That rentals collected on the Housing Project

by Harsh Utah should be added to the amount of the lump
sum contract. The amount erroneously calculated was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3')

i)

$165,986.49. The inclusion of this rental income was
specifically prohibited by the October 4th agreement.
See page 76 of defendants' brief.
Profits have been increased by the elimination of
demonstrated and undisputed expenditures by Harsh interests, such as :
(a) The payment by Harsh Utah and Schnitzer for
financing, planning and commencing the Project. The
amounts thus eliminated were $157,442.76. See appendix,
main brief, page 15.
(b) Eliminations of indirect overhead costs as audited by all of the auditors. The amount eliminated, $120,.384.90; amount substituted, $45,631.34; difference, $7 4,753.56.
(c)

Eliminations of interest expenses actually in-

curred and paid by Harsh Utah during the construction
period. Amount, $105,845.39. Total amount of these
actual demonstrated and undisputed expenditures which
were eliminated erroneously, $338,041.71, and if said expenditures are allowed, it would eliminate the possibility
of any bonus whatsoever to the plaintiff.
Other costs which have been eliminated by the decision of the trial court, defendants submit, are proper and
should have been allowed by the trial court but since they
.are disputed, either in amount or as to whether or not
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they are proper, they are not included in this summary,
and only costs which were actual, demonstrated and disputed are included.
(c)

Conclusion

It is respectfully submitted that if the court does any
one of the following: (1) properly interprets the October 4th agreement, (2) properly permits the inclusion of
all actual, demonstrated and undisputed expenses, or (3)
includes only the proper items of income to Harsh
Investment then plaintiff would not and could not be
awarded a bonus.
•

RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
DWIGHT L. KING
Counsel for .Appellants

530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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APPENDIX

HIC
a;c Pay.
Paid

Deduct

Balance
to
Hill Field
Costs

1952

50;000
15,100
17,000
113,525

10,784
13,501
314,890
195,365
169,031
160,587

342,254
165,259
142,287
227,128
674,576
287,685
255,557
230,991
86,544
115,734
12,635
49,200

151,500
21,556
20,784
36,500
333,971
5,400
29,886
50,322
33,415
53,681
2,042
10,621

190,754
143,703
121,503
190,628
340,605
282,285
225,671
180,669
53,129
62,053
10,593
38,579

19,242
15,333
50,093
53,978

2,694
6,479
32,072
53,956

16,548
8,854
18,021
22

$~,788,279

$1,040,504

$2,747,775

July ·-----------------------$
August -------------------September -------------October ------------·----November --------··---December --------------

10,784
13,501
364,890
210,465
186,031
274,112

........................................
...........................................

$

$

1953

January -----------------February ---------------M.arch ··-------------------April ---------------·-----1lay -----------------------June-----------------------July-----------------------August -------------------September -----------October -----------------November -------------December .............................
1954

January -----------------February---------------March ---------------------April .............................................
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H-U-C
Rec'd. from
Irving

Paid to
RIC

H-I-C
Rec'd. from a;c Pay.
HUC
Paid

1952
July ............$ 47,295
991
August -------Sept. -----------· 337,106
Oct.--·-···------- 221,241
Nov.-----------· 296,550
85,927
Dec. ... ................................

10,78-~
13,501
364,890
210,465
186,031
274,112

----------------

---------------· $

--------·-------

----------------

262,700
700

262,700
700

----·---·-------

--------------- ..
129,200
393,000
190,000
207,000
185,400
66,000
3,100
8,700
9,000

342,254
165,259
142,287
227,128
674,576
287,685
255,557
230,991
86,544
115,734
12,635
49,200
19,242
15,333
50,093
53,978

336,419
221,991
235,000
16,000

336,419
221,991
235,000
16,000

1953
Jan. -----------Feb. -----------March ..........
April ............................
May ............
June ............
July ............
August ........
Sept .............
Oct .............
Nov.............

... .......................................

Dec.---·-····--·

......................................

129,200
393,000
190,000
207,000
185,400
66,000
3,100
8,700
9,000

Jan. ·----------- ---------------Feb. ------------ ...........................................
March ........ ---------------April .......... --------------·-

5,000
6,000
11,500
11,400

5,000
6,000
11,500
11,400

Total ----------$2,752,704 $2,298,110

$2,298,110

261,768
220,558
104,182
129,234
400,980
187,958
209,384
184,521
65,009
...........................................

1954

Mort. Pr. ____ 2,240,546
Escrow-------- 512,158

73,279
44,274
$2,415,663

73,279
44,274
$2,415,663 $3,788,279
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